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Posner Reigns in CERCLA: Amcast
Industrial Corp. & Elkhart Products
Corp. v. Detrex Corp.
T. CHRISTOPHER DANIEL*
Once again, like the proverbial mouse in the maze, it is time
to delve into the convoluted ambiguities embodied in the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA).' This comment examines the Seventh
Circuit's attempt in Amcast Industrial Corp. & Elkhart Products
Corp. v. Detrex Corp.' to decide an issue of first impression at the
appellate level. 3 The question before the court was "whether...
the Act [CERCLA] extends to any chemical spill that creates an
environmental hazard."4
This statute "was designed 'to bring order to the array of
partly redundant, partly inadequate federal hazardous substances
cleanup and compensation laws.' "5 Congressional intent in enact-
ing this statute was "to provide for liability, compensation,
cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances re-
leased into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites."' In general, cases have consistently inter-
preted CERCLA in light of these purposes:
* Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.,
Class of 1995, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1987, Wake Forest University.
CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2 Amcast Indus. Corp. & Elkhart Products Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th
Cir. 1993).
3 Id. at 747. "This is an important question that has not until now been the subject of
an appellate case." Id.
' Id. (emphasis added).
5 State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985)
(quoting FREDERIC R. ANDERSON ET AL.. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
568 (1984)).
o 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting the original text of CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)), cert.
denied, IIB S.Ct. 2014 (1991).
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First, Congress intended that the federal government be imme-
diately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective re-
sponse to the problems of national magnitude resulting from
hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poi-
sons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful
conditions they created.7
Essentially, CERCLA is "a remedial statute designed .. . to pro-
tect and preserve public health and the environment." 8
Despite Congressional intent, "CERCLA has acquired a
well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an in-
definite, if not contradictory, legislative history."' In fact, many
courts have criticized the statute as an inept piece of federal
drafting. 5
Depending on what definitions are accorded to various words
and phrases within the statute, sections, subsections, and even
sentences within CERCLA seem to contradict themselves with
little or no internal consistency. Indeed, those courts which have
attempted to unravel CERCLA's definitions have found no sol-
ace in either the "plain meaning" of the statute or the reams of
legislative history. Instead, in an attempt to glean legislative in-
tent, courts seem to resort to a sort of "Purkinje phenomenon,""
hoping that if they stare at CERCLA long enough, it will burn
a coherent afterimage on the brain. 2
It is against this background that decisions concerning CERCLA
must be viewed.
CERCLA provides several types of liability provisions'" so
that the cost of cleanup will ultimately be borne by those parties
' Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
(D. Minn. 1982)).
I d. (citing United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D.C. Mo. 1985)).
Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902.
'o See, e.g.. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 677 (5th Cir. 1989); Ded-
ham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1080; Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp 788, 792 (W.D. Okla. 1989);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
n "An optical illusion named for Johannes E. Purkinje (1787-1869), whereby the eye
retains an afterimage of an object in a different color from the original." C.P. Holdings,
Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assoc., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432, 435 n.3 (D.N.H. 1991).
11 Id. at 435.
13
After identifying a responsible party and a release that causes the incurrence
of response costs as the two major prerequisites for a cost recovery suit, the
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responsible for the hazardous waste site. Applicable to this com-
ment is Section 9607(a) of CERCLA, which imposes strict liabil-
ity' 4 on the following responsible parties: (1) generators of haz-
ardous waste; (2) present or past owners at the time of disposal of
facilities where hazardous wastes are disposed; (3) transporters of
hazardous waste; and (4) those who arrange for the disposal or
transport of hazardous waste. 16 These potentially responsible par-
ties are liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs incurred at a fa-
cility"6 "from which there is a 'release, or a threatened release' "17
of a hazardous substance. 18 The Environmental Protection Agency
next question to consider is the nature of the liability which Section [9607]
imposes. Although the language of Section 19607](a) provides little guid-
ance, courts have articulated two main principles in the area. First, responsi-
ble parties are to he strictly liable-the government is not required to estab-
lish any degree of fault. Second, responsible parties may be held jointly and
severally liable for the government's response costs, but liability may also be
apportioned in appropriate cases.
SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE - MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY
AND LITIGATION §14.01[61 [b], 14-141 (emphasis added). For an examination of these lia-
bility provisions, see id. §§ 14.01[6][b] - 14.01 [6][c], 14-141 to 14-149.
11 See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32) (1988). This provision stipulates that
the standard of liability shall be the same as the standard under the Clean Water Act § 2,
33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988)), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
Is 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
1198 (2d Cir. 1992); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317 (11th Cir. 1990).
10 The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equip-
ment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned
treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, stor-
age container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area
where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9).
17 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4).
t The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pur-
suant to section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any element, compound, mix-
ture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title,
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed
pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 69211 (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C.A. §6901 §6901 - 691 has been suspended by
Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317 (a) of
Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the
Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has
taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subpara-
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(EPA), at the President's direction, is to respond when a release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance has occurred. 9
CERCLA also enables private parties to recover the costs of
cleanup, known as "response costs," 20 against responsible par-
ties.21 Furthermore, in order to establish a private cause of action
under CERCLA, the plaintiffs must prove that: (1) the defendant
is within one of the four statutory categories of covered parties
liable for such costs;22 (2) there has been a release or threatened
release of any hazardous substance from a facility;2" (3) such re-
lease or threatened release has caused plaintiff to incur costs;
2 4
and (4) the response costs were necessary and consistent with the
national contingency plan.20
This comment will discuss the background cases applicable to
the particular sections of CERCLA involved in Amcast Industrial
Corp., the facts and holding of that case and an analysis of the
impact this case may have on future CERCLA decisions.
I. THE STATUTORY SECTIONS INVOLVED IN AMCAST
INDUSTRIAL CORP.
A. Section 9607(a)(4): The "Consumer Product in Consumer
Use" Exception to "Facility" and Applicable Background Cases
CERCLA, "so far as [it] bears on this case, imposes liability
for 'response costs' (the costs of eliminating an environmental haz-
ard) on the 'owner and operator of a . . . facility' from which a
hazardous substance has been released."2 6
graphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include
natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable
for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14).
19 42 U.S.C § 9604 (a)(1).
20 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B).
22 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a).
-3 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4).
24 Id.
1 Id. For a discussion of the four elements of the prima facie case for response cost
recovery, see, e.g., C.P. Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assoc., Inc., Prudential Ins.
Co. of America v. United States Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (D.N.J. 1989); cf
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1271, 1275-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating a fifth element necessary to a private cause of action which ap-
pears to be implicit in the above elements).
" Amcast Indus. Corp. & Elkhart Products Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 748
(7th Cir. 1993) (citing CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(1) (1988)).
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Facility [is broadly defined as] "(A) any building, structure, in-
stallation, equipment, pipe or pipeline ... , well, pit, pond, la-
goon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor ve-
hicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located.1
7
However, the statutory definition of facility excludes "a consumer
product in consumer use .... "28 The interpretation of this phrase
and its relationship to a facility is the first of two issues discussed
by the court in Amcast Industrial Corp.
A review of prior cases and their handling of the "consumer
product" exception to the definition of "facility" leads to the con-
clusion that there are three distinct lines of cases, each interpret-
ing the exception in a different manner." The first line of cases is
the "location line." In these cases, the key to interpreting the con-
sumer product exception to facility depends on where the "con-
sumer product in consumer use" has come to be located. For ex-
ample, in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. New York City
Housing Authority, 0 the plaintiffs brought suit under CERCLA
to recover the removal costs incurred after the plaintiffs removed
asbestos-containing material flaking off the undersides of buildings
erected over the plaintiff's tracks. The court concluded that since
the "'consumer products' exclusion is located in the definition of
'facility,' a definition clearly addressing locations covered by
CERCLA, the relevant question actually pertains to the location
of the hazardous substance which is a consumer product in con-
sumer use, not merely the use to which the substance was put.""s
The court then proceeds to back into the interpretation of this ex-
" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B)).
28 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9).
" An exhaustive search of treatises and journals provided nothing illustrative on this
narrow point. Therefore, this comment uses the applicable body of case law to formulate
three distinct lines of cases.
"o National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1271,
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
31 Id. at 1276; see People v. Blech, 976 F.2d 525, 527 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining
the holding of 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1991); C.P. Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assoc., 769 F. Supp. 432, 438-39 (D.N.H.
1991) (holding a hotel constructed with asbestos is a facility); Electric Power Bd. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding a transformer con-
taining PCB is not a facility); New York v. General Electric Co. 592 F. Supp. 291
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding a drag strip sprayed with transformer oil is a facility).
1993-941
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
ception by explaining what it does not exclude from the statutory
definition of facility:
[T]he proper approach is to construe the "consumer product in
consumer use" exclusion from the broad definition of "facility"
to mean the term does not encompass consumer products in con-
sumer use which are, in effect, containers of hazardous sub-
stances, such as transformers which contain PCB's.
In this case, the support pillars and the undersides of build-
ings were themselves coated with ACM (asbestos containing
material). The ACM was not, for instance, contained in drums
waiting to be put to a consumer use, in which case the drums
would not be facilities. Therefore, the consumer products excep-
tion does not apply.
Thus, the buildings and tracks are facilities for CERCLA
purposes, since, as defendants conceded at argument, they were
sites where a hazardous substance had come to be located.
3 2
Therefore, the consumer product exception to facility, as inter-
preted in the location line of cases, is not applicable if the facility
is one where a hazardous substance has come to be located.
The second line of cases may be referred to as the "produc-
tive use" line. The crucial factor to interpreting the consumer
product exception to facility in these cases is what utility is de-
rived from the activity at hand. For example, in Dayton Indepen-
dent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 3 the plaintiffs
brought an action under CERCLA against asbestos manufactur-
ers and suppliers to recover the cost of removing asbestos products
from the buildings.3 4 The court held that since "[tihe provision
exempting consumer products obviously was meant to protect
from liability those who engage in production activities with a use-
ful purpose, as opposed to those engaged in the disposal of hazard-
ous substances,"" the manufacturers and suppliers were not liable
under CERCLA. Thus, this interpretation of the "consumer prod-
uct in consumer use" exception to facility protects those facilities
which are engaged in productive uses.
1, National R.R. Passenger Corp., 819 F. Supp. at 1276.
33 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990).
34 Id.
* Id. at 1065; see also Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D.C.




The third line of cases will be referred to as the "individual
consumer" line. In these cases the critical component in interpret-
ing the consumer product exception to facility is who uses the
product. For example, in Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia,"
the defendant's argument that railcars, being a part of a com-
muter train service, are consumer products in consumer use and
thus excepted from CERCLA liability was rejected by the court."7
"CERCLA's legislative history indicates that the consumer prod-
ucts exception was meant to cover individual consumers."3" In
support of their contention, the court cites numerous statements
made by Senator Cannon.3 Senator Cannon's amendment to Sec-
tion 9601(9) became the "consumer products exception" that is at
issue in Amcast Industrial Corp.40 Therefore, the individual con-
sumer line interpretation of the consumer product exception to fa-
cility shields facilities designed for individual use. "1
31 823 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
37 Id. at 1232.
38 Id. at 1233.
s' Id. Senator Cannon stated:
S. 1480 contains no exclusion for consumer products. Therefore, it has been
suggested that this would mean that an individual consumer is subject to
strict, joint, and several liability for a 'release' from any product that con-
tains one of the numerous hazardous substances listed on pages 24 to 28 of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee report. While staff
has been informed that such a result was not intended, the term 'facility' as
it is presently defined would include consumer products, and the report does
not in any way clarify that this term does not include consumer products. An
amendment will be offered to clarify this matter.
126 CONG. REC. S12,916-23 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980).
,0 Reading Co., 823 F. Supp. at 1233.
Senator Cannon did in fact offer an amendment that became part of section
9601(9) and coined the 'consumer products exception.' Senator Cannon
made the following remarks when explaining this amendment:
[O]ne of my amendments would exclude consumer products from the
definition of 'facility,' thus precluding any unintended application of
notification requirements and liability provisions to consumers.
Id. (citation omitted).
" See Reading Co., 823 F. Supp. at 1232-33 (discussing various definitions of "con-
sumer product").
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 317 (6th ed. 1990) defines consumer product as:
"Any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes
. .. A look at the definition provided in the Consumer Product
Safety Act, a statute in place at the time of CERCLA's passage in
1980, is also instructive. The act defines the term consumer product
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
B. Section 9607(a)(3): "Arranged For" Liability and Applicable
Background Cases
CERCLA, so far as it bears on this case, imposes liability for
response costs on "any person who by contract . arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person."" This concept of "arranged for" liability
is the second issue discussed by the court in Amcast Industrial
Corp.
The act that generally falls within the purview of this specific
statutory language is the hauling of hazardous waste to a hazard-
ous waste facility. The CERCLA action that subsequently will
arise will involve a hazardous waste facility that is the subject of a
cleanup. The facility owners will then try to bring all previous
haulers and companies that arranged for disposal at their facility
into CERCLA's net of liability." For example, in U.S. v. Bliss,
the court found that four defendants were jointly and severally
liable under CERCLA for response costs incurred by the federal
government and Missouri at two hazardous waste sites. 4 These
four defendants were "the person arranging to transport and dis-
pose of hazardous waste, his corporate successor, the corporation
owning a site where waste was deposited, and a corporate officer
of the corporation that owned the site."' 5
Perhaps a better case on point is Transportation Leasing Co.
v. California,' in which the court found that "a municipality that
contracted for the disposal of residential waste at the Operating
Industries site in Monterey Park, California may have incurred
arranger liability" '47 under CERCLA. The facts involved in this
any article, or component thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale
to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary house-
hold or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the
personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a
permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recrea-
tion, or otherwise.
Id.
42 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(3) (1988).
13 See, e.g., Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,773 (C.D. Cal 1991); U.S. v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879
(E.D. Mo. 1988).
" United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
" Id.




case are representative of the general fact pattern discussed above.
The EPA, the State of California, and the California Hazardous
Substance Account sued sixty-four industrial companies for re-
sponse costs expended in cleaning up the Operating Industries
site .4  These companies agreed to pay $61,000,000 to the EPA
and the State of California. 9 Subsequently, these companies as-
serted a reimbursement action under CERCLA50 based on ar-
ranger liability against twenty-nine municipal defendants, the
County of Los Angeles, and the State of California."
The interpretation of the phrase "arranged for disposal" is
also a matter of concern as it is not defined in CERCLA.52
"Moreover, [w]hether an 'arrangement for disposal' exists de-
pends on the facts of each case." 53 However, three principles have
become apparent from the case law in determining whether a par-
ticular set of facts constitutes "an arrangement for" disposal:54
First, the courts will look beyond a defendant's characterizations
in deciding whether a particular transaction constitutes an 'ar-
rangement for disposal' of a hazardous substance;55 persons hav-
ing a legal responsibility for the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances cannot evade liability by simply closing their eyes and
doing nothing as to the method of disposal of their hazardous
wastes;5" and (3) courts have concluded that "a liberal judicial
interpretation of the term is required in order (to) achieve CER-
CLA's 'overwhelmingly remedial' statutory scheme."5"
49 Id.
I d.
See CERCLA §107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B) (1988) (allowing recovery rrom
another responsible person).
" Transportation Leasing Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. LIst.) at 20,773.
62 Id. at 20,777.
53 Id. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317 (1th Cir. 1990)).
" Transportation Leasing Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,777.
61 Id. (citing United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 873 (D. Del.
1989)).
56 Id. (citing United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985)).
51 Id. (citing Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1317).
1993-94]
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II. AMCAST INDUSTRIAL CORP. V. DETREX CORP.
A. Background and Facts
"The principal plaintiff, Elkhart (Amcast is its parent, and
can be ignored), manufacture[d] copper fittings at a plant in Indi-
ana.' 51 One of the chemicals used in the manufacturing process
was the solvent trichloroethylene (TCE).56 The plaintiff purchased
TCE from several chemical manufacturers, including the defend-
ant, Detrex Corp. ("Detrex").60 Detrex delivered TCE to Elkhart
in its own trucks and sometimes used a common carrier, Trans-
port Services, to deliver the solvent." In 1984, the ground water
beneath a pharmaceutical plant adjacent to Elkhart's plant was
found to be contaminated with TCE. 2 "There [was] evidence that
both Detrex's and Transport Services' drivers sometimes spilled
TCE accidentally on Elkhart's premises while trying to fill
Elkart's storage tanks and that some of this spillage found its way
into the ground water beneath the pharmaceutical plant .... 9,63
Elkhart spent more than $1 million in cleaning up the ground
water contamination caused by the spillage of TCE on its own
grounds. 4 Elkhart brought this suit under section 9607(a) of
CERCLA"6 in order to establish that Detrex was a responsible
party as well and "to shift Elkhart's response costs (that is, the $1
million it had incurred in cleaning up the contamination) from
itself to Detrex."6




" Id. at 747-48.
0I Id. at 748. The cleanup at the pharmaceutical plant is not relevant to this
comment.
00 Amcase Indus. Corp., 2 F3d at 748. However, the court alluded to the fact that
Detrex's expert purportedly attempted to demonstrate the insignificance of the spills:
[A]n expert hired by Detrex has estimated that out of almost 800 gallons of
TCE that have been found in the soil and ground water beneath the pharma-
ceutical plant, no more than 49 came from these delivery spills, the rest hav-
ing leaked from the storage tanks or a waste-disposal pit or the plant itself or
been spilled by other suppliers' drivers.
Id.
00 Id.
00 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4) (1988).
06 Amcast Indus Corp., 2 F.3d at 748.
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Amcast Industrial Corp. involved two issues that parallel the
arguments used by the parties in the case. The first issue, as men-
tioned previously,"7 involves the consumer product exception to fa-
cility. Detrex argued that as to the spillage from its own trucks,68
it was not liable under CERCLA because its trucks were "con-
sumer products in consumer use" and therefore were excepted
from the definition of facility.69 The second issue, as mentioned
above,"0 concerned the applicability of the "arranged for" liability
under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA. Elkhart used this section
in an attempt to make Detrex liable for the spillage of TCE from
Transport Services' trucks. The parties and issues can best be ex-
plained in the following manner: Elkhart, the principal plaintiff
and copper fittings manufacturer, sued Detrex, the defendant and
shipper, based upon sections 9607(a)(3) and (a)(4) of CERCLA
in an attempt to recover for the spillage from Detrex's own trucks
and from Transport Service's common carrier trucks.
B. Holding of the Court Concerning the "Consumer Product"
Exception
As to the "consumer product in consumer use" exception, the
Seventh Circuit, per Judge Posner, ruled that Detrex was a re-
sponsible person under CERCLA for the TCE spilled from its
own trucks and that the consumer product exception did not apply
in this situation. 1 In explaining its reasoning, the court stated:
The difficult question is whether the reference to consumer prod-
uct in section 9601(9), the definition of "facility," is to be read
literally. If it is read literally, the only consumer product ex-
empted by the statute is the consumer product that is a facility.
e See supra part I.A.
Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 750 (characterizing facts in terms of satisfaction of
prima facie case).
Each of the tanker trucks owned by Detrex in which it delivered TCE to
Elkhart constituted prima facie a "facility" within the meaning of the
Superfund law, section 9601(9)(A), contained a hazardous substance,
namely TCE, and "disposed of" it when the truck spilled it, because the
statute defines disposal to include spilling.
d; see CERCLA S 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), (29) (1988).
6 Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 748.
'o See supra part l.B.
Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 750.
1993-94]
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The alternative is to read the exemption as referring to facilities
that contain consumer products. 2
The court then proceeded to employ the alternative reading to the
facts of the case and determined that under this "extraordinarily
strained reading of 'consumer product,' ,,73 Detrex would not be
liable for the TCE it spilled from its own trucks onto Elkhart's
property.74 However, "[t]his approach does excessive violence to
the statutory language. The exception is for facilities that are con-
sumer products in consumer use, not for consumer products con-
tained in facilities. ' 7 5 The court continued:
Although read as it is written the exception is narrow, it is not
meaningless, for the statute defines "facility" so broadly that it
could be thought to include a can of lye. Since Detrex, not Elk-
hart, was responsible for the environmental damage resulting
from the spillage of TCE from Detrex's trucks, there is no
anomaly, so far as the purpose of the Superfund statute is con-
cerned, in deeming Detrex a responsible person along with Elk-
hart. A literal interpretation that furthers the statute's purpose
is hard to beat.7"
Thus, as far as Judge Posner is concerned, the critical element in
interpreting the consumer product exception to facility is a literal
interpretation of the statutory language itself.
C. Holding of the Court Concerning "Arranged For" Liability
As to the second issue concerning "arranger liability," the
Seventh Circuit ruled that Detrex was not a responsible person
under CERCLA for the TCE spilled from trucks owned by Trans-
port Services.77 Judge Posner, in explaining the court's reasoning,




[W]e would conclude that until the TCE transported in Detrex's trucks
spilled, it was a consumer product in consumer use. It ceased to be in con-
sumer use when it spilled; but the spilled TCE was no longer in the trucks or
any other property owned by Detrex, and when it hit the ground it was in




76 Id. at 749.
7 Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F3d at 750.
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to spill TCE on Elkhart's premises. "" The court granted the fact
that the statute does define disposal to include spilling but made
clear that "the critical words for present purposes are 'arranged
for' . . [which] imply intentional action. The only thing that De-
trex arranged for Transport Services to do was to deliver TCE to
Elkhart's storage tanks. It did not arrange for spilling the stuff on
the ground." 7 9
Elkhart argued that disposal includes accidental spilling be-
cause it is so defined in the statute. Judge Posner escaped from
this argument by illustrating that a statute may have several
meanings for the same word. For example,
[i]n the context of the operator of a hazardous-waste dump,
"disposal" includes accidental spillage; in the context of the
shipper who is arranging for the transportation of a product,
"disposal" excludes accidental spillage because you do not ar-
range for an accident except in the Aesopian sense illustrated by
the staged accident. 80
Continuing the reasoning above, Judge Posner clearly ex-
plained that "arranger liability" should apply to an individual or
corporation (the shipper) who desires "to get rid of its hazardous
wastes [and] hires a transportation company to carry them to a
disposal site."'8 1 Here, if a spill occurs enroute, the shipper would
be found a responsible person under CERCLA. 82 But, if the ship-
per is "arranging for the delivery of a useful product, he is not a
responsible person within the meaning of the statute, and if a mis-
hap occurs en route, his liability is governed by other legal
doctrines. '
Judge Posner concluded the court's consideration of this issue
with two statements. First, "[i]t would be an extraordinary thing
to make shippers strictly liable under the Superfund statute for
the consequences of accidents to common carriers or other reputa-






" Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 750.
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faith to ship their products."8 ' Second, "[tihis conclusion does not
create a regulatory void. Apart from common law liability of
transportation companies for chemical spills, noted in our Indiana
Harbor Belt R.R. decision, there are a variety of direct regulatory
controls over the transportation of hazardous substances, illus-
trated by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act . . .
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Impact of the "Consumer Product" Exception Decision
As noted earlier, the case law on this exception appears to
have produced three distinct approaches s" to the interpretation of
this particular statutory language. Does Judge Posner's opinion in
the Seventh Circuit create a fourth?
Judge Posner reads this exception literally stating, "[tihe ex-
ception is for facilities that are consumer products in consumer
use, not for consumer products contained in facilities.18 7 This lit-
eral interpretation can best be characterized as a two-part test:
(1) whether the object from which the leak/spill emanates is a
facility as defined in the statute;8 8 and (2) whether the object
from which the leak/spill emanates is a "consumer product in
consumer use." 89
To better understand the impact of this decision, it is helpful
to go through the complete analysis that must be applied in order
for a facility to be exempted from liability under CERCLA. The
statute imposes liability for response costs on the owner and oper-
ator of a facility from which a hazardous substance has been re-
leased. 90 The statutory definition of facility excludes, however, a
"consumer product in consumer use."'" Thus, presumably, if the
I d. (citing Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174,
1180-81 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing the six critical factors necessary to holding an institu-
tion or person strictly liable for a particular activity).
I d. (citation omitted).
' See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1271
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (location line); Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co.,
906 F.2d 1059 (productive use line); Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F. Supp.
1218 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (individual consumer line).
" Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 750.
See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9) (1988).
8' Id.




object from which the spill emanates passes the two-part test
above, (i.e., is defined in the statute as a facility and is a consumer
product in consumer use92) then the owner and operator of the
exempted facility will not be liable under CERCLA for response
costs for a spill from the exempted facility. The alternative, "to
read the exemption as referring to facilities that contain consumer
products," 93 would be an "extraordinarily strained reading."
94
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit has produced a fourth line of cases
interpreting the consumer product exception to facility.
An analysis of the previous cases that delineated the three
other lines will facilitate a better understanding of how this fourth
construction will work. The location line, illustrated by National
Railroad Passenger Corp., interpreted the "consumer product"
exception from the perspective that it is where the "consumer
product in consumer use" is located. 5 The issue in that case was
whether the owners of the building could escape liability from
CERCLA by characterizing the asbestos as a "consumer product
in consumer use" when it was applied to the building structures.e6
If the two-part test above is applied to the situation in National
Railroad, the asbestos fails because it is not a facility as defined
by the statute. 97 Thus, the outcome under the Seventh Circuit's
test and the outcome under the location line analysis are consis-
tent because in both cases the owner and operator of the building
could not escape CERCLA liability by characterizing the asbestos
as a "consumer product in consumer use.""8
The productive use line, elucidated in Dayton Independent
School District," interpreted the consumer product exception by
focusing on what utility is derived from the activity at hand. In
Dayton, a case very similar to National Railroad, the issue was
whether the manufacturers and suppliers could be held liable for
the removal costs of the asbestos."" Again, running asbestos
92 Id. at 748.
93 Id.
" Id.
" National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp 1271, 1275
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
"Id.
" See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9) (1988) (defining "facility").
" See National R.R. Passenger Corp., 819 F. Supp. at 1276.
" Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.
1990).
10, Id. at 1064.
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through the Seventh Circuit's two-part test, it is not a facility as
defined by the statute, and therefore the owner and operator of
the building could not evade CERCLA liability utilizing this ex-
ception. 10' The resolution of the case is the same regardless of the
test that is applied.' 02
The individual consumer line, manifested in Reading Co.,'"3
interpreted the exception in light of who uses the product. In that
case, the defendants argued that railcars, as a part of a commuter
train service, are consumer products in consumer use and thus ex-
cepted from CERCLA liability."' Taking the railcars through the
Seventh Circuit's two-part test, they satisfy element one as they
are statutorily defined facilities,' 05 but the question under element
two is whether they are consumer products in consumer use. The
courts have taken a fairly common-sensical view of the meaning of
"consumer products in consumer use." For example, the Reading
Co. court 0 6 addressed this issue:
Under this rationale, things defined as facilities by CERCLA,
such as buildings, motor vehicles, and aircraft would be trans-
formed into consumer products in consumer use, simply by vir-
tue of the fact that people use them. "If the court were to accept
[defendant's] definition of a facility, any commercial building or
property that could be bought or sold would have to be classified
as a consumer product if the property is used by the general
public. This would effectively exclude all private actions against
previous landowners, despite the fact that section 9607 clearly
provides for such actions."
10 7
Presumably, a railcar interpreted in light of the aforementioned
statement would not pass the muster required by element two.
Again, whether the test employed is that of the Seventh Circuit or
the individual consumer line, the results are consistent as the de-
10, Id. at 1065.
112 Id. at 1064. "CERCLA does not provide a private right of action to recover costs
of removal of asbestos-containing materials from structure of buildings." Id.
Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F. Supp. 1218, 1232 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
"I Id.
'0' See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. 9601 (9)(a) (Supp. 1993).
' Reading Co., 823 F. Supp. at 1235 (applying the rationale "that because consum-
ers used the Reading Terminal complex, the entire area should be considered a consumer
product. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument becomes absurd.").
101 Id. (quoting C.P. Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assoc., Inc., 769 F. Supp.
432, 439 (D.N.H. 1991)).
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fendants could not escape CERCLA liability under either
approach.
Logically, element one of the two-part test should be fairly
straightforward in its application as the definition of facility is
statutorily defined."0 8 It seems the issue now will become whether
the statutory facility is a "consumer product in consumer use" so
as to satisfy element two. Defendants will naturally argue for an
expansive view, but in light of the characterization given by C.P.
Holdings, Inc.,' 09 it appears doubtful that courts will agree." 0
There now appear to be four distinct lines of cases, but only
one of these lines has been pronounced at the court of appeals
level. As the previous analysis showed, the Seventh Circuit test
announced by Judge Posner provided consistent results with the
other three interpretations of the "consumer product exception"
when applied to the same fact patterns. Therefore, the most con-
servative route to take in applying this exception to a facility is to
utilize the Seventh Circuit approach.
B. The Impact of the "Arranged For" Decision
The facts of this case are uncharacteristic of the typical situ-
ations that are resolved under this section of CERCLA."' In fact,
this second issue in Amcast Industrial Corp. is not unraveled by
reference to section 9607(a)(3)." 2 As Judge Posner states, "[tihe
words 'arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment' appear to contemplate a case in which a person or in-
stitution that wants to get rid of its hazardous wastes hires a
transportation company to carry them to a disposal site.""' 3 Here,
there is the transportation of a useful product (TCE), not hazard-
ous waste, and it is not to a disposal site but to a manufacturing
plant.
But see Amcast Indus. Corp. & Elkhart Products Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d
746, 750 (7th Cir. 1993). "Although read as it is written the exception is narrow, it is not
meaningless, for the statute defines 'facility' so broadly that it could be thought to include
a can of lye." Id.
See also Reading Co., 823 F. Supp. at 1218.
"'Id.
"' See infra part I.B.
.. See Arncast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 751. Judge Posner quickly removed this case
from applicability of this section and embarked upon the question of whether CERCLA
will provide a private cause of action in these circumstances at all, id.
-' Id.
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Thus, the question becomes whether CERCLA provides a
private cause of action that addresses this factual scenario.114
Judge Posner, in concluding that it does not,11 refers to the prior
Seventh Circuit decision of Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v.
American Cyanamid Co."16 In this case, the court announced the
six factors that must be satisfied before a particular activity will
be subjected to strict liability: 17 (1) the risk of harm was high;
(2) the harm that would ensue if the risk materialized could be
great; (3) the accident could not be prevented by the exercise of
due care; (4) the activity was not a matter of common usage, so
there was no presumption that it was a highly valuable activity
despite its unavoidable risk; (5) the activity was inappropriate to
the place in which it took place; and (6) the value to the commu-
nity of the activity did not appear to be great enough to offset its
unavoidable risks.
The Seventh Circuit's decision not to apply CERCLA to the
second issue in Amcast Industrial Corp. can be better understood
once it has been processed through these six factors. The particu-
lar activity here was that of a shipper hiring a common carrier to
deliver a hazardous substance to a manufacturer." 8 The risk of
harm was not high. In fact, society's risk of harm here was either
a late delivery or no delivery at all of a useful product to a manu-
facturing plant. The harm that would ensue if the risk material-
ized was at worst a rise in the cost of the finished product or per-
haps a temporary shortage. The accident, a late or no delivery of
TCE, could be controlled by the exercise of due care. The activity
was a matter of common usage, was appropriate to the place in
which it took place, and had value to the community great enough
to offset its unavoidable risks.
'1 Id.
11 Id.
"' 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
I' d. at 1176-77.
Id. It may be argued that the particular activity here was the hauling and delivery
of hazardous substances (TCE). This activity was not run through the analysis for two
reasons, id. First, the Seventh Circuit, in the Amcast Industrial Corp. opinion, did not
focus on this activity but on that of the shipper and the common carrier. Ameast Indus.
Corp. & Elkhart Products Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993). Second,
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. dealt with an almost identical fact pattern and held a chemical
manufacturer was not strictly liable for the consequences of a spill even though it shipped a
flammable, toxic chemical in a railroad tank car through a heavily populated area. Indiana
Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1176-77.
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As this painful exercise shows, not a single element required
to place a particular activity under the strict liability regime is
present in this factual scenario. This scenario was what the Sev-
enth Circuit meant when Judge Posner stated that, "[i]t would be
an extraordinary thing to make shippers strictly liable under the
Superfund statute for the consequences of accidents to common
carriers or other reputable transportation companies that the ship-
pers had hired in good faith to ship their products."1 19 This activ-
ity is not a type of activity type that the rationale behind strict
liability't 0 would support. It therefore appears that the Seventh
Circuit's test for whether a private cause of action exists under
CERCLA, when it has not yet been recognized, is the strict liabil-
ity test announced in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad.2
The conclusion that shipper's like Detrex are not responsible
for the TCE spilled from common carrier's like Transport Ser-
vices' trucks "does not create a regulatory void." '122 "Apart from
common law liability of transportation companies for chemical
spills, 2 ' noted in our Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad decision,
there are a variety of direct regulatory controls over the transpor-
tation of hazardous substances, illustrated by the Federal Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act .... "24 Thus, CERCLA does
Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 751.
'2 Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1177.
1 To test whether the strict liability criteria would work as well on other causes of
action that also have not been recognized under CERCLA, it was applied to asbestos re-
moval. However, it was concluded that, "CERCLA does not provide a private right of
action to recover the costs of removal of asbestos-containing materials from the structures
of buildings." Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th
Cir. 1990). The manufacturers or suppliers did not know the risk of harm was great at the
time the asbestos was installed, id. Also, no one knew that there was a risk of harm when
the asbestos was installed, id. The accident (release of asbestos fibers) could have been
prevented by the exercise of due care if the fact that they were hazardous was known, id.
The activity of using asbestos for insulation was of common usage and was appropriate to
the place, and the value to the community was offset by its known unavoidable risks, id.
Thus, the test, insofar as it is applied to asbestos-removal and the shipper who contracts
with a common carrier, seems to be consistent.
122 Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 751.
The applicability of a pure negligence action to this type of hazardous material
activity is discussed at length in Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1179.
"I Ameast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d at 751 (citation omitted); COOKE, supra note 13,
§ 15.05, 15-215 to 15-216. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) was
enacted in 1975 and amended in 1990. It applies to interstate, and in certain instances
intrastate, transportation of hazardous materials. The HMTA sets forth specific require-
ments intended to ensure safety in the transportation of hazardous materials. These regula-
tions include provisions governing transport (by air, highway, rail and water) and reporting
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not apply to "any chemical spill that creates an environmental
hazard." 12 5 The ramifications of this decision appear to be that if
the spill or accident is not one where the strict liability factors of
American Cyanamid are sensibly applicable, then CERCLA lia-
bility does not apply, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
As stated earlier, this decision leaves no void in the statutory
realm as to recovery possibilities for Detrex. In fact, Amcast In-
dustrial Corp. forces an efficient use of legislative and judicial re-
sources by restraining CERCLA from engulfing both the common
law and previous statutes that relate to hazardous materials. The
remedial goals of CERCLA1 6 are maintained, and the spill site is
cleaned. Also, there remains a private cause of action against
Transport Services by Elkhart under a pure negligence action.
CONCLUSION
The decisions reached in Amcast Industrial Corp. concerning
the consumer product exception to facility and arranger liability
may at first blush appear overly constraining. However, as the
analysis has shown, they are well-reasoned approaches to ambigu-
ous legislation and provide very clear tests to the future CERCLA
litigant where CERCLA previously provided none. The Seventh
Circuit's approach, per Judge Posner, keeps CERCLA from con-
suming already existing legislation; while not all spills are covered
by CERCLA, all spills are covered.
As Judge Posner has said:
of spills, discharges, and other incidents of hazardous materials. HMTA §§ 101-115, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1801-12 (1975)(amended 1990).
I Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
12 C.P.C. Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 791 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1071,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
The purpose of CERCLA is certainly to encourage remedial and removal
actions. However, by imposing strict liability on broad categories of defend-
ants, Congress also evidenced its intent to make the responsible parties pay
for the costs of the cleanup. The cases have repeatedly interpreted CERCLA
in view of its dual purposes. First, Congress intended that the federal govern-
ment be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective
response to the problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous
waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison bear the costs and re-
sponsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.
C.P.C. nCI, 731 F. Supp. at 790.
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To the point that courts could achieve "more" of the legislative
objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough
to respond that statutes have not only ends but also limits. Born
of compromise, laws such as CERCLA . . . do not pursue their
ends to their logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce
stopping points no less than to implement other legislative
choices.'
As CERCLA is up for reauthorization in 1994,1" Judge Pos-
ner's interpretations of both the consumer product exception and
arranged for liability are sensible directions for Congress to take.
They mesh well with the remedial underpinnings of CERCLA but
keep the Superfund statute from running amuck.
" Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir.
1988) (citations omitted).
138
Congress reauthorized and strengthened CERCLA through the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), and again
reauthorized CERCLA in 1991. Congress will have to act again in 1994 to
reauthorize CERCLA; this next reauthorization process could result in sig-
nificant changes to the law, and battle lines are already being drawn about
how CERCLA should be changed.
Bruce P. Howard & Kevin E. Solliday, CERCLA and Similar State Laws: Overview and
Current Developments, 797 PLI/Corp 39 (1992).
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